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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 14 SUMMER, 1960 NUMBER 3
FEDERAL REMOVAL JURISDICTION - CIVIL ACTION
BROUGHT IN A STATE COURTt
by
James William Moore* and William VanDercreek**
I. INTRODUCTIONT HE Constitution of the United States does not mention removal
of suits from state to federal courts. Section 2 of article III states
that federal judicial power shall extend to certain enumerated cases.
This does not imply that cases, over which Congress can give the in-
ferior federal courts jurisdiction, must be commenced in those courts.!
The first Judiciary Act of 1789 contained provisions for removal of
certain suits from state courts to the federal circuit courts,2 and a re-
moval jurisdiction has existed since that time.' While the constitu-
tionality of some particular provisions may be questioned, the general
power of Congress to provide for removal cannot be doubted.4 Section
1441 is the general removal section of the Judicial Code of 1948 and
subsection (a) provides as follows:
§ 1441. Actions removable generally.
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State Court of which the district courts of
t This Article is adapted from a portion of an extensive treatment of Removal to be
published in Moore's Federal Practice by Matthew Bender & Company.
* B.S., Montana State College; J.D., University of Chicago; J.S.D., Yale University;
Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. Professor Moore is presently a member of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States.
** B.S., Iowa State College; J.D., State University of Iowa; LL.M., Yale University;
Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'Railway Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S.
(2 Otto) 10 (1875).
' I Stat. 73 § 12 (1789). In general see Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 91 (1923).
'Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941). In Tennessee v. Davis, 100
U.S. (10 Otto) 257, 265 (1879) the Court said: Whether removal from a State
to a Federal court is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, as laid down in Story's
Commentaries on the Constitution, sect. 1745, or an indirect mode of exercising
original jurisdiction, as intimated in Railway Company v. Whitton (13 Wall. 270),
we need not now inquire.
4 See note 1 supra. See also Tennessee v. Davis, supra note 3, where the Court observed:
The constitutional right of Congress to authorize the removal before trial of
civil cases arising under the laws of the United States has long since been be-
yond doubt. It was exercised almost contemporaneously with the adoption of
the Constitution, and the power has been in constant use since.
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the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place in which such action
is pending .... (Emphasis supplied.)'
There are several requisites which must be met for removal under
the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441. This Article con-
cerns one of the more abstruse limitations, namely, whether the pro-
ceeding (which a defendant(s) seeks to remove) constitutes a civil
action brought in a state court.
While the removal statutes dealing with suits against federal offi-
cers,' members of the armed forces,7 and certain civil rights cases au-
thorize removal of both civil actions and criminal prosecutions, the
general removal statute, quoted above," confines itself to any "civil
action brought in a State court" of which, in general, the federal dis-
trict courts have original jurisdiction." In confining itself to civil
actions, it follows counterparts in the Judicial Code of 19111 and
earlier general removal statutes." The earlier counterparts spoke of
any "suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity." Although it has
been intimated that the more concise expression, "civil action," may
have a broader connotation," the Reviser's Note to the present statute
indicates that the term "civil action" was substituted in § 1441, in
lieu of the earlier terminology, to harmonize with the federal rules;
and the Note does not indicate that any change of substance was in-
tended.'
' 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (a) (1950). The phrase "civil action" is also
found in other sections of the removal statute: § 1442. Federal officers sued or prosecuted
("(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court. . . . (b) A
personal action commenced in any State court .. "); § 1442a. Members of armed forces
sued or prosecuted ("A civil or criminal prosecution in a court of a State .. "); § 1443.
Civil rights cases ("Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced
in a State court .. ").
a62 Stat. 938 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442 (1950).
770A Stat. 626 (1956), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442a (1959).
s62 Stat. 938 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1443 (1950).
9 Supra pp. 297-98.
1 Section 1441 is keyed generally to original jurisdiction.
"Jud. Code S 28 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1940).
"2Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470 S 2. For discussion see Tennessee v. Union & Planters'
Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
"I1n Iowa v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 37 Fed. 497 (C.C.S.D.Iowa 1889), appeal dis-
missed, 145 U.S. 631 (1892), Judge (later Justice) Brewer, in holding that a state action,
though civil in form was penal in nature and not removable, stated:
If congress had intended that the mere form of the action determined the
right of removal, apt language would have been, "actions civil in form," or
perhaps the more general expression, "civil actions;" but when the language
is, "of a civil nature," it discloses an intent as affirmed by the cases of Ames
v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 460, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437, and State v. Railroad Co.,
33 Fed. Rep. 726, that the court should always look beyond the matter of
form to the purpose, object, nature of the action.
"4In Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 185 F.2d 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1950), Judge Sanborn,
a member-of the Advisory Committee in drafting the Judicial Code of 1948, stated:
[Vol. 14
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II. MUST BE A CIVIL ACTION
It has been said that the "expression 'civil action' as used in 28
USC § 1441 (a) appears to be used in contradistinction to 'criminal
case' or action or proceeding."15
Whether a state proceeding is a civil action, for removal purposes,
and has been properly removed involves the construction of the re-
moval statute; and hence presents a federal matter,"6 and state char-
acterizations of the proceeding are not determinative.
In making the determination the federal courts have not consid-
ered the form of the state action as controlling. The nature of the
right asserted has furnished the test of whether a proceeding was of
a civil or criminal nature. Consequently, a suit may be criminal in
form and yet civil in nature, or vice versa." Thus, a state action of
The term "civil action" was used in § 1441 as a substitute for "suit of a
civil nature", § 71, Title 28, U.S.C., 1946 Ed., and equivalent terms found
in former removal statutes. See Reviser's Notes relative to § 1441 in Title
28 U.S.C.A. A "civil action" is a civil suit.
' Range Oil Supply Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 140 F. Supp. 283, 285 (D. Minn.
1956), aff'd, 248 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1957). See also Milwaukee County v. M. E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1935). Relative to the phrase "suits of a civil nature," found
in former 54 Stat. 143, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1) (1940), which dealt with original jurisdic-
tion, the Court said that the phrase
is used in contradistinction to "crimes and offenses," as to which the juris-
diction of the district courts is restricted by . . . [36 Stat. 1091, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 41(2) (1940)] to offenses against the United States. Thus suits of a civil
nature within the meaning of the section are those which do not involve
criminal prosecution or punishment, and which are of a character tradition-
ally cognizable by courts of common law or of equity. Such are suits upon ajudgment, foreign or domestic, for a civil liability, of a court having juris-
diction of the cause and of the parties, which were maintainable at common
law upon writ of debt, or of indebtitatus assumpit.
t
"Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954); Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941); Crivello v. Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Middle-
sex, 183 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D. N.J. 1960) ("The local law is determinative of the nature
of the proceeding but the federal law is determinative of its removability.").
"
7 Commissioners of Road Imp. Dist. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257 U.S. 547, 557 (1922):
The question of removal under the federal statute is one for the consideration
of the federal court. It is not concluded by the view of a state court as to
what is a suit within the statute. Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467,
477; Mason City l Ft. Dodge R.R. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570; Madisonville
Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239. While the decision
of the state court as to the nature of a proceeding under state statutes sought
to be removed is, of course, very persuasive, it is not controlling because
involved in the application of a federal statute and the exercise of a federal
constitutional right.
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 29 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S.
655 (1929); Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 185 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1950).
"'Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 33 Fed. 721 (C.C.N.D.Ill. 1888) (crimi-
nal in form; treated as civil; opinion by Justice Harlan); Iowa v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.,
37 Fed. 497 (C.C.S.D.Iowa 1889) (civil in form; treated as criminal in nature; opinion
by Judge (later Justice) Brewer), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 631 (1892); Arkansas v.
St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 173 Fed. 572 (C.C.W.D.Ark. 1909); City of Montgomery v. Postal
Tel. Cable Co., 218 Fed. 471 (M.D. Ala. 1914), see note 22 infra; State ex rel. Warren
v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 30 F. Supp. 410 (W.D. Mo. 1939), see note 21 infra; Mulligan
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 20 F. Supp. 953 (D. N.J. 1937), see note 21 infra. See Ames
v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884).
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quo warranto, whether in form a criminal proceeding or civil action,
has been treated as civil for removal purposes."
A suit brought by and for the sole benefit of an individual to re-
cover a penalty or damages, including punitive, is civil in nature,
although recovery may help the state in vindicating its policy." On
the other hand, a suit to recover a penalty brought by the state or
for the state or a state agency, that is not to redress an injury to its
property rights but is brought to vindicate its public policy, and
the recovery is for the benefit of the state or state agency, has been
held not to be civil in nature for purposes of removal.21 Similarly,
a suit by the state or a state agency to vindicate its criminal laws by
' Ames v. Kansas, supra note 18 (a suit in nature of quo warranto, in form civil,
by state to dissolve state railroad corporation because of attempted ultra vires consolidation
held civil action for purposes of removal). In Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
supra note 18, at 729 (criminal in form) Justice Harlan stated:
I am of opinion that, as the primary and only material object of the present
proceeding is to enforce a civil right, it is to be regarded as a suit of a
civil nature, within the principle of the decision in Ames v. Kansas, and
within the meaning of the [removal] act of congress; and this, notwithstand-
ing the court has a discretion, in addition to a judgment of ouster, to impose
a fine.
Cf. Moloney v. American Tobacco Co., 72 Fed. 801 (C.C.N.D.III. 1896).
2°Gruetter v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 181 Fed. 248 (C.C.W.D.Tenn. 1909)
(suit by individual against telephone company to recover penalties for discriminatory
service); Younts v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 192 Fed. 200 (C.C.E.D.Ark. 1911);
Cross v. Ryan, 124 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1941) (suit brought in federal court under Illinois
Dram Shop Act by widow and minor children, to recover damages for loss of their means
of support, against tavern proprietor causing intoxication of deceased); Salonen v. Farley,
82 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Ky. 1949) (suit brought in federal court under Kentucky statute
permitting third person to recover treble amount of sum lost to defendant in a gambling
transaction where loser or creditor does not sue, is both remedial and penal; the suit is,
nevertheless, civil for purposes of federal court's original jurisdiction; and the statute is
not unenforceable as a "penal statute" within rule that one sovereign will not enforce the
penal laws of another); Hartlieb v. Carr, 94 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Ky. 1950) (similar).
21 Iowa v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 37 Fed. 497 (C.C.S.D.Iowa 1889) (action by state
under statute providing for it to bring civil action to recover a forfeit for extortion held
criminal in nature and non-removable), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 631 (1892); Arkansas v.
St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 173 Fed. 572 (C.C.W.D.Ark. 1909). State ex rel. Warren v.
F.W. Woolworth Co., 30 F. Supp. 410, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1939) involved a suit by the city
treasurer to collect statutory damages of four times the amount of tax for filing false
statements of goods sold. The fact that the suit is in form on a forfeited bond is imma-
terial:
[A] suit by the state or for the state or by an official in behalf of the state,
to recover a penalty for some wrongful act from an individual, to recover
that penalty for the state or for disposition by the state to some governmental
agency of the state, must be a suit which is not civil in its nature. A suit
civil in its nature is an action for private injury looking to a recovery for
private benefit.
And see Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888) (Supreme Court did not
have original jurisdiction of an action by a state upon a judgment recovered by it in one
of its courts against a corporation of another state for a pecuniary penalty for violation
of its municipal law). But see and compare Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296
U.S. 268 (1935).
Qui tam.-Mulligan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 20 F. Supp. 953 (D. N.J. 1937)
(actions by informers to recover statutory penalty for alleged violations of lottery statutes
not removable); and see Younts v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 20.
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enjoining violations thereof,2 and suits of a related nature," have
been held not to be civil in nature for purposes of removal. A re-
lated reason sometimes articulated in denying removal in these situa-
tions is that one sovereign will not enforce the penal laws of another
sovereign. 4 To the extent that this doctrine remains valid," a federal
court would not enforce the penal law of a state either on original or
removal jurisdiction. On the other hand, injunction suits brought on
behalf of the state that involve property rights and are basically
within "civil," in contrast to "criminal,"2 equity jurisdiction are
treated as civil in nature for removal purposes.27 In brief, then, the
22 Moloney v. American Tobacco Co., 72 Fed. 801 (C.C.N.D.Ill. 1896). Where an
information in equity by state attorney general to prohibit foreign corporation from doing
business in Illinois in violation of its criminal antitrust laws was remanded because the
statute did not create a cause for action in equity within the federal court's cognizance,
the suit is not one of a- civil nature and is nonremovable. Cf. quo warranto cases cited
in note 19 supra. City of Montgomery v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 218 Fed. 471 (M.D. Ala.
1914) (state equity suit brought by municipality).
23Texas ex rel. Martin v. Continental Distilling Sales Co., 67 F. Supp. 389, 390 (N.D.
Tex. 1946) where actions by district attorney on the relation of an individual person, to
enjoin defendants from continuing in the liquor business in Texas under licenses issued
by the state Control Board, remanded: "Each of the causes smacks, may be clearly sensed,
as criminal in nature, for they deal with police power and the welfare of the people and
the control of liquor vending."
24 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888) and Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U.S. 657 (1892), to the effect that one sovereign will not enforce the penal laws of
another sovereign, are often cited and discussed. See, e.g., Iowa v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.,
37 Fed. 497 (C.C.S.D.Iowa 1889); State ex rel. Warren v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 30 F.
Supp. 410, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1939); City of Montgomery v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 218
Fed. 471 (M.D. Ala. 1914).
25 In Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), the Court ruled that a state could not refuse
to enforce a penal law of the United States. Justice Black did, however, state, at 393:
"Nor need we consider in this case prior decisions to the effect that federal courts are not
required to enforce state penal laws."
A suit on a judgment based on a state tax claim is, however, an action of a civil
nature for purposes of original federal jurisdiction. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.,
296 U.S. 268 (1935).
" For discussion of "criminal" equity jurisdiction see 5 Moore's Federal Practice
38.24[3], at 190 (2d ed. 1959).
27 Ohio ex rel. Seney v. Swift & Co., 270 Fed. 141 (6th Cir. 1921), appeal dismissed,
260 U.S. 146 (1922). This was a suit brought by a state officer on behalf of the state
under its antitrust laws to enjoin the defendant from obtaining possession of its property
held in storage for alleged violation of the antitrust laws; for the appointment of a re-
ceiver to take charge of the property and for eventual sale thereof; and to enjoin the
defendant from any further acts or crimes in restriction of trade and commerce. The
court treated this suit, for removal, as a suit of a civil nature between private individu-
als-between the state officer as an individual and the defendant corporation-where the
defendant in its removal petition asserted a substantial claim that the state statute was
unconstitutional; and sustained removal on the basis of diversity between the state officer
and defendant corporation. This case is treated as the reverse of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), which held that where a party sues to enjoin a state officer from enforcing an
allegedly unconstitutional statute violative of plaintiff's rights, the action is not a suit against
the state but against the officer as an individual wrongdoer.
In rejecting the assertion that the suit in Ohio ex rel. Seney, supra, was not civil in na-
ture, the court stated, at 152:
The plaintiff further contests the removal because he says the action com-
menced by his complaint was not a civil action, but was rather one based
upon and for the enforcement of the Ohio penal statutes. So far as concerns
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
distinction that is drawn in these cases dealing with penalties and
suits to enjoin is primarily between private and public rights. Suits
to vindicate a private right and redress a wrong in violation of such
right have been classed as civil. Actions at law to vindicate a public
right by obtaining a judgment on the basis of a penalty, or suits in
equity, whose dominant characteristics bring it within "criminal"
rather than "civil" equity jurisdiction have been treated as non-civil
in nature and nonremovable.
However, the dichotomy between civil actions and criminal prose-
cutions will not suffice because the term "civil action" does not em-
brace every action which is not a criminal proceeding. Thus, although
a proceeding may not be criminal in nature, a determination must
still be made of whether the action comes within the removal termi-
nology. While the term "civil action," for removal purposes, em-
braces what may be conveniently designated as orthodox actions at
law and suits in equity, it also embraces other actions." To constitute
a "civil action" it is not necessary that the suit be based on a com-
mon-law right; it may be based on a statutory right." Nor is it nec-
essary that the state proceeding be in the form of a traditional action
at law or suit in equity."0 A state declaratory action which presents
a justiciable case or controversy is a civil action. 1 A proceeding that
is civil in nature is a civil action although it is summary in charac-
the form of the matter, this is plainly a civil action. It is not brought to
cause imprisonment or to collect a penalty, but it is a proceeding in a court
of equity, commenced by proper pleading, having a plaintiff and having
defendants, seeking an injunction and a receiver, and, further, practically
final relief through the receivership. This answers every description of a civil
action, rather than of the criminal or penal actions with which those of a civil
nature must be contrasted. Cases like those in which a city, which is a branch
of the state government is undertaking to enforce its ordinances by in-
junction and at the same time to collect the tax and the penalty secured by
the ordinance (City of Montgomery v. Postal Co. . . . [218 Fed. 471 (N.D.
Ala. 1914)]) are distinguishable, as soon stated.
So far as concerns the substance of the matter, the question on this objec-
tion is the same as on the matter of diverse citizenship. If the action were
one by the state of Ohio, it would have the color of, and it might be con-
sidered as, a proceeding in execution of its sovereignty rather than a mere
civil action; but since the validity of the Ohio law is forcefully challenged
under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Seney cannot be heard to say that the
action is by the state rather than by him.
s E.g., a proceeding before an "administrative board" charging an unfair labor practice
which was essentially the same as an action for breach of contract that could be brought
in a state court. Tool & Die Makers, Lodge 78 v. General Elec. Co., 170 F. Supp. 945
(E.D. Wis. 1959). Concerning a declaratory action, see note 31 infra; a statutory man-
damus which is basically an action at law or suit in equity, see note 47 infra; a statutory
proceeding of a judicial nature to review administrative action, see p. 303 infra.
'
9 Brisenden v. Chamberlain, 53 Fed. 307 (C.C.D.S.C. 1892).
" See cases cited notes 32 and 33 infra; Tool & Die Makers, Lodge 78 v. General Elec.
Co., 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
"Southern Harlan Coal Co. v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., 58 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Ky.
1945) (and removable when the other requisites for removal exist).
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ter." A statutory proceeding in a state court to review an administra-
tive determination is a civil action,"5 unless the review proceeding is
such an integral part of the administrative process as to constitute
a continuation of the administrative proceeding." An inter partes
proceeding, that is not ancillary to a probate proceeding, is a civil
action."3 In brief, the former term "suit," as does its present successor
"action," embraces various modes of proceeding; it is a comprehen-
sive term that, in general, applies to any inter partes proceeding in
2 Famous Realty v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 81 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. N.Y. 1948)
(eviction proceeding by landlord against tenant for possession and judgment for accrued
rent); State ex rel. Glassell v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 795 (W.D. La. 1937).
"Range Oil Supply Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 248 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1957),
affirming 140 F. Supp. 283 (D. Minn. 1956); In re Chicago, M., St.P. & P. R.R., 50
F.2d 430 (D. Minn. 1931); Larkin v. Roseberry, 54 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Ky. 1944)(statutory bill in equity to review Local Review Committee's marketing quota under 52
Stat. 63 (1938), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (1940)); Vann v. Jackson, 165 F. Supp. 377 (E.D.
N.C. 1958) (similar). In distinguishing Decker v. Spicer Mfg. Div. of Dana Corp., 101
F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ohio 1951), Judge Stanley, in the Vann case, stated at 380:
In the latter case removal would have required the federal court to assume
administrative functions under the workmen's compensation laws of Ohio.
In addition, its actions would not have been of a final and binding nature.
Clearly, a proceeding which calls for the exercise of administrative functions
and the rendering of non-binding decisions is not a "civil action" in a legal
sense.
aDecker v. Spicer Mfg. Div. of Dana Corp., supra note 33 (proceeding in Ohio court
for review under Ohio workmen's compensation laws not removable), see p. 317 infra;
for judicial comment on this case, see Vann v. Jackson, supra note 33. Collins v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 129 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (statutory state court review of
Public Service Commission's findings and order, that proposed condemnation would be in
the public interest, is a continuation of the administrative proceedings and not a civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction; opinion by Judge Whittaker); for judicial comment on this case, see
Range Oil Supply Co. v. Chicago, RI. & P. R.R., 140 F. Supp. 283, 285-86 (D. Minn.
1956). Ex parte Oklahoma, 37 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1930).
as In Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 10, 20 (1875), in sustaining the right of
removal, Justice Field stated:
The suit in the parish court is not a proceeding to establish a will, but to
annul it as a muniment of title, and to limit the operation of the decree
admitting it to probate. It is, in all essential particulars, a suit for equitable
relief,-to cancel an instrument alleged to be void, and to restrain the en-
forcement of a decree alleged to have been obtained upon false and insufficient
testimony. There are no separate equity courts in Louisiana, and suits for
special relief of the nature here sought are not there designated suits in equity.
But they are none the less essentially such suits; and if by the law obtaining
in the State, customary or statutory, they can be maintained in a State court,
whatever designation that court may bear, we think they may be maintained
by original process in a Federal court, where the parties are, on the one side,
citizens of Louisiana, and, on the other, citizens of other States.
In Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883), Justice Matthews stated:
Jurisdiction as to wills, and their probate as such, is neither included in nor
excepted out of the grant of judicial power to the courts of the United
States. So far as it is ex parte and merely administrative, it is not conferred,
and it cannot be exercised by them at all until, in a case at law or in equity,
its exercise becomes necessary to settle a controversy of which a court of the
United States may take cognizance by reason of the citizenship of the parties.
This was quoted with approval by Justice Bradley in Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S.
467, 476 (1890); see pp. 309-11 infra.
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a court of justice; and if civil in nature, is a "civil action.""6 It is
immaterial that the form of the state proceeding would require re-
pleading in the federal court or would be awkward to try."' How-
ever, not every claim of an affirmative character set forth in a civil
suit is an action for removal purposes. Thus, although defendant
pleads matters in its answer of such a character that, even after
plaintiff has discontinued his original suit, these matters constitute
the basis, under state law, of a proceeding that may go on to trial
and judgment, the proceeding is not a removable suit."8
Let us now consider in more detail two types of proceedings which,
because of their special nature, warrant individual treatment: arbi-
tration and mandamus.
Arbitration.-A judicial proceeding to obtain arbitration is a civil
action for removal purposes."' Similarly, a proceeding to confirm or
vacate an arbitration award is civil and removable if the other re-
quisites of removal jurisdiction exist.4 However, in this connection,
if there is first a judicial proceeding to compel arbitration, arbitra-
tion is ordered, and subsequently a proceeding is brought to confirm
30Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 185 F.2d 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1950); Dulion v. S.A. Lynch
Enterprise Fin. Corp., 53 F.2d 568, 569 (5th Cir. 1931) ("The suing out of a writ of
attachment for the enforcement of an alleged debt is a suit within the meaning of the
statute [36 Stat. 1094 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1940)] providing for the removal of
a 'suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity'; the word 'suit' being a comprehensive one,
and applying to any proceeding in a court of justice whereby a remedy given by law for
the enforcement of a claim or demand is sought."), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 540 (1932);
Larkin v. Roseberry, 54 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Ky. 1944); Vann v. Jackson, 165 F. Supp.
377 (E.D. N.C. 1958).
In Weston v. City of Charleston, 8 U.S. (2 Pet. 449) 171, 173 (1829), Chief
Justice Marshall defined "suit" as follows:
The term is certainly a very comprehensive one, and is understood to apply
to any proceeding in a court of justice, by which an individual pursues
that remedy in a court of justice, which the law affords him. The modes
of proceeding may be various, but if a right is litigated between parties in
a court of justice, the proceeding by which the decision of the court is sought,
is a suit.
3
7 Commissioners of Road Imp. Dist. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257 U.S. 547 (1922), see
text at note 81 infra; Santa Margarita Mut. Water Co. v. State Water Rights Board, 165
F. Supp. 870 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
"SWest v. Aurora City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 139 (1868). For related discussion, see
p. 325 infra.
3' Davenport v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1957).
Contra: Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 7 F.2d 511 (S.D. N.Y. 1925) (pro-
ceeding to have state court appoint a third arbitrator not a suit of a civil nature), aff'd
on procedural ground not here relevant, 11 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1926); cf. In re Red Cross
Line, 277 Fed. 853 (S.D. N.Y. 1921).
The other requisites of removal jurisdiction must, of course, be satisfied. In the Daven-
port case removal on the basis of diversity and jurisdictional amount were upheld. The
main discussion concerned jurisdictional amount, and the court repudiated the theory of
In re Red Cross Line, supra, that no pecuniary value can be given to the right to compel
arbitration.
40Hetherington & Berner v. Melvin Pine & Co., 256 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1958) (in
federal suit involving contract federal court ordered arbitration; after an award was made,
Pine & Co. moved in the state court to vacate the award, and removal of this proceeding
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or vacate the award, this latter proceeding is ancillary to the first."1
Hence, if the first proceeding is in a state court and it is not removed
to the federal court or, if removed, is remanded, then a subsequent
proceeding in the state court to confirm or vacate the award is not
removable because it is not a separate proceeding-not an inde-
pendent action 4-- within the removal statute."
Mandamus.-A mandamus proceeding is not a civil action of which
the federal district courts, held within the states, have original juris-
diction;" hence, such a proceeding instituted in a state court is not
removable. The crux of this doctrine is not that a mandamus pro-
ceeding fails to qualify as civil in nature, but that it is not within
the federal district courts' original jurisdiction and hence does not
satisfy this additional requirement for removal." The federal court
will, however, look through form to substance to determine whether
the proceeding is basically one of mandamus or whether it is a pro-
ceeding at law or in equity over which it has original jurisdiction."
III. MUST BE BROUGHT IN A STATE COURT
The preceding discussion has dealt primarily with the characteris-
tics of a "civil action" without consideration of the related require-
on the basis of diversity and jurisdictional amount was upheld); Minkoff v. Scranton
Frocks, 172 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. N.Y. 1959). See Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co.,
supra note 39 (dictum).
The point was raised but not decided in International News Serv. v. Gereczy, 160
F. Supp. 5 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) since jurisdictional basis for removal under Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act was lacking.
1 Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 29 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1928) (proceeding to
have state court appoint a third arbitrator is part of one arbitration proceeding looking
to an award, and confirmation of award is ancillary and nonremovable), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 655 (1929); Hetherington & Berner v. Melvin Pine & Co., supra note 40.
4 See also pp. 319-26 infra.
41 Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 29 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1928).
" Updegraff v. Talbott, 221 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1955); Marshall v. Crotty, 185 F.2d
622 (1st Cir. 1950). See Sleeth v. Dairy Prod. Co., 228 F.2d 165, 169 (4th Cir. 1955).
The district court for the District of Columbia does have original jurisdiction over
mandamus proceedings. Kendall v. United States, 12 U.S. (12 Pet. 524) 834 (1838).
4 Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U.S. 450 (1887). See Santa Margarita Mut. Water Co. v.
State Water Rights Board, 165 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
4662 Stat. 973 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) and (b); Range Oil Supply Co. v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 248 F.2d 477, 479 (8th Cir. 1957). In general, removal juris-
diction under § 1441 (a) and (b) is no broader than original federal jurisdiction, e.g.,
no divorce case may be removed from a state court to a federal court because federal
courts do not have original jurisdiction in this area.
" State ex rel. Glassell v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 795 (W.D. La. 1937)
(summary statutory mandamus proceedings to collect monies due under contract for sale
of oil treated as action at law; removal sustained); Santa Margarita Mut. Water Co. v.
State Water Rights Board, 165 F. Supp. 870, 873 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (The "court will look
at the substance of the matter and not to form. For example, if in reality the removed
case sets forth a cause for equitable relief [citing cases], this court would not be barred
by the title of the action alone from hearing the cause [citing cases].").
For discussion of when mandatory relief can be obtained through the equitable remedy
of a mandatory injunction, see Note, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 903 (1938).
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ment that it be brought in a "state court." This requirement is satis-
fied whether the state court is one of limited or general jurisdic-
tion,4 but the proceeding therein must have reached the maturity
of a civil action to be removable.49 The name which the state at-
taches to its tribunal is not controlling; instead, the function which
the tribunal actually performs in the proceeding is controlling."
For removal purposes, if the function being performed is nonjudicial
then the state tribunal is not a court;" if, however, the function is
judicial then the tribunal is a court." While state decisions as to the
judicial or nonjudicial character of the tribunal and the function
being performed by it are entitled to serious consideration, they are
not controlling."
It has been said that the Supreme Court of the United States has
adopted a functional rather than a literal test in determining whether
a state proceeding may be regarded as an action in a state court with-
in the meaning of the removal statute. 4 Thus, although a state tribu-
"'Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 10, 19-20 (1875). Here the Court said:
It mattered not whether the suit was brought in a State court of limited or
general jurisdiction. The only test was, did it involve a controversy between
citizens of the State and citizens of other States? and did the matter in dis-
pute exceed a specific amount? And a controversy was involved in the sense
of the statute whenever any property or claim of the parties, capable of
pecuniary estimation, was the subject of the litigation, and was presented by
the pleadings for judicial determination.
For discussion of what constitutes a "court" and "suit," see also Fuller v. County of
Colfax, 14 Fed. 177 (C.C.D.Neb. 1882). Board of county commissioners of a county is
not a court; the filing of a monetary claim with the board is not a suit; but after the
docketing of an appeal by the claimant in the state district court, from a partial dis-
allowance, where pleadings are filed and the cause proceeds in the ordinary way, a suit
is then pending in a state court for purposes of removal, and claimant could remove. At
this time either plaintiff or defendant could remove. Delaware County Comm'rs v.
Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133 U.S. 473 (1889).
Justice of the Peace Court is a "State court" within removal statute when performing
the judicial function. Katz v. Herschel Mfg. Co., 150 Fed. 684 (C.C.D.Neb. 1906) ("Jus-
tices of the peace, when clothed with judicial power to hear and determine cases and
render judgments, must certainly be regarded as courts."); Cappetta v. Atlantic Ref. Co.,
12 F. Supp. 89 (D. Conn. 1935). Contra: Rathbone Oil Tract Co. v. Rauch, 5 W. Va.
79 (1871). The point is mooted in New York I. & P. Co. v. Milburn Gin & Mach. Co.,
35 Fed. 225 (C.C.W.D.Tenn. 1888).
"' Village of Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 228 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1956).
"Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467 (1890), see p. 309 infra; Village of
Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., supra note 49 (Nebraska's "three-judge con-
demnation court is in reality just another board of appraisers.") ; Tool & Die Makers, Lodge
78 v. General Elec. Co., 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
"Upshur County v. Rich, supra note 50; Village of Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light &
Power Co., 228 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1956); Fuller v. County of Colfax, 14 Fed. 177
(C.C.D.Neb. 1882).
SaPage 299 supra; Commissioners of Road Imp. Dist. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257
U.S. 547 (1922), see p. 299 supra; Tool & Die Makers, Lodge 78 v. General Elec. Co.,
170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
"sCommissioners of Road Imp. Dist. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., supra note 52; Tool &
Die Makers, Lodge 78 v. General Elec. Co., supra note 52.
"4Tool & Die Makers, Lodge 78 v. General Elec. Co., 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis.
1959).
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nal bears the name of an administrative board and the state su-
preme court has characterized the board's function as nonjudicial
in adjudging unfair labor practice charges, removal of a proceeding
before the board has, nevertheless, been sustained where the proceed-
ing was equivalent to a traditional action for breach of contract
that complainant could have elected to bring in a state court."5
A judicial proceeding to obtain arbitration or to confirm or vacate
an arbitration award is a civil action for removal purposes and re-
movable when the other requisites of removal jurisdiction are met."s
But a proceeding, although commenced by the service of a notice to
arbitrate, which is not at that time in a state court but is pending
before the arbitrator, is not at that time a civil action "brought in
a State court"; and is not then removable. 7
A. Administrative And Judicial Proceedings Distinguished
Troublesome removal problems arise in applying the foregoing
and related principles where it is unclear whether the particular
state proceeding is administrative or in some other respect nonjudi-
cial; and, if it is, at what juncture, if at all, s the proceeding can be
said to be a civil action brought in a state court. A federal district
court "does not sit to review on appeal action taken administratively
or judicially in a state proceeding"; 9 and a proceeding before a body
acting in an administrative capacity is not removable because it is
" Tool & Die Makers, Lodge 78 v. General Elec. Co., supra note 54 at 950. Judge Tehan
stated:
It appears to this court that the proceeding before the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board meets the test of a judicial proceeding within the
meaning of the Federal Judicial Code. In respect of subject matter, we repeat
again that although the matter is described as an unfair labor practice the
action in reality is a simple suit based on alleged breach of contract. No
unfair labor practices are alleged in the complaints other than ones arising
from breach of contract. Under Wisconsin law an identical action could have
been brought in the trial courts of the State of Wisconsin, and had the com-
plainants elected so to do, there would be no question of the right of respond-
ent to remove the cause to the Federal court.
In respect of the procedures employable before the Board, a review of the
statutory language reveals its judicial character.
56 See pp. 304-05 supra.
57 Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 870, 876 (S.D. N.Y. 1959):
At the time the notice was served it could not be predicted whether the
proceeding would ever come before any court. It is brought in the state court
when that court is first asked to participate in the proceeding, for instance,
either by a motion to compel or to stay the arbitration . . . or by a motion
to confirm or vacate the award. . . . Until one of these steps is taken, or the
court is in some way requested to intervene, the proceeding is not removable.
s8 For example, in most states a proceeding in a state court to review an administrative
determination under the workmen's compensation law is held to be such an integral part
of the administrative process that it is not removable. See p. 317 infra.
" Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 581 (1954), noted, 64 Yale L.J.
600 (1955).
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not a "civil action brought in a State court.""0 If, then, removal is
sought at the administrative or pre-judicial stage, it is premature;
and the removed proceeding should be remanded."' On the other
hand, if the state proceeding is judicial, i.e., a "civil action brought
in a State court," and removal is not sought within the limited time
provided by § 1446, then the removed proceeding is subject to re-
mand unless the objection for untimeliness is waived." Two other
limitations on removal must be borne in mind. The civil action
brought in a state court: (1) must be one "of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction"; and (2) only
a defendant can remove. As the reader is perhaps aware, after a
proceeding that follows administrative or other nonjudicial action
gets into a state court, it may qualify as a civil action brought in a
state court, but still may, nevertheless, not be removable. This may
be so either because the district courts do not have original juris-
diction of such a proceeding, 3 or because the party seeking removal
is not a defendant; and state classification of a party as plaintiff or
defendant is not controlling. 4 This limitation of removal to a de-
fendant has not always existed. At certain times in our judicial his-
tory either a plaintiff or defendant could remove. " Hence, cases dis-
cussing and holding that a proceeding is a suit for removal purposes
are still in point as to that matter, but not as to the further matter
that the suit was removable, if today the party seeking removal is
not a defendant. Bearing these principles in mind, we now center our
60 Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467 (1890), see pp. 309-10 infra; Village of
Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 228 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1956); Ex parte Okla-
homa, 37 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1930). See Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 2
(1885), see p. 315 infra; Fuller v. County of Colfax, 14 Fed. 177 (C.C.D.Neb. 1882),
see p. 306 supra.
State administrative board may be treated as a court. Tool & Die Makers, Lodge 78
v. General Elec. Co., 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board), see also pp. 302-03 supra.
6" Upshur County v. Rich, supra note 60; Village of Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light &
Power Co., supra note 60.
" Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 169 U.S. 92 (1898); Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S.
594, 598 (1885); McLeod v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 233 F.2d 242, 244 (10th Cir. 1956).
Compare Park v. Hopkins, 179 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ind. 1960) (permitting defective re-
moval petition to be amended after expiration of 20 day period) with Browne v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Il1. 1959) (stating that court has no power to
permit amendment of defective removal petition after expiration of 20 day period). The
Park case is more persuasive in its reasoning and seems to be more in accord with the
Supreme Court cases supra.
61Collins v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mo. 1955). see p. 303
supra. See Commissioners of Road Imp. Dist. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257 U.S. 547 (1922).
"Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954) (condemnor is not a de-
fendant for removal purposes although treated as a defendant by Iowa law). This case was
noted in 64 Yale L.J. 600 (1955).
6' Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470 § 2; see Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S.
454 (1894).
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attention upon the problem of whether a particular proceeding is a
"tcivil action brought in a State court."
Upshur County v. Rich"' expounds and illustrates most of the
foregoing principles. In this leading case certain landowners took
an appeal, under state law, from a tax assessment to a county court
by filing a petition therein alleging that the acreage was less than
the assessed figure and that the valuation was excessive. Immediately
after filing this petition in the county court they removed the pro-
ceeding into the federal court, as they were at that time entitled to
do whether they were plaintiffs or defendants, provided the pro-
ceeding was otherwise removable. The circuit court refused to re-
mand and, after a hearing on the merits, reduced the assessment.
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Bradley stated:
But is an appeal from an assessment of property for taxation a suit
within the meaning of the law? In ordinary cases it certainly is not.
By the laws of all or most of the States, taxpayers are allowed to
appeal from the assessment of their property by the assessor to some
tribunal constituted for that purpose, sometimes called a board of
commissioners of appeal; sometimes one thing and sometimes another.
But whatever called, it is not usually a court, nor is the proceeding a
suit between parties; it is a matter of administration, and the duties
of the tribunal are administrative, and not judicial in the ordinary
sense of that term, though often involving the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions. Such appeals are not embraced in the removal act.
In this respect the law of West Virginia does not differ from that of
most other States. It is true that the tribunal of appeal is called the
"county court," but it has no judicial powers except in matters of pro-
bate. In all other matters it is an administrative board, charged with
the management of county affairs .... ..
ee135 U.S. 467 (1890).
" The Court continued in detail as follows, at 472-74:
It was under this [West Virginia] law that the appeal from the assessment
in the present case was taken. In our judgment it was not a suit within the
meaning of the removal act-though approaching very near to the line of
demarcation. We cannot believe that every assessment of property belonging
to the citizen of another State can be removed into the federal courts. Cer-
tainly the original assessment, made by the township or county assessors, could
not be called a suit, and could not be thus removed; and there is, justly,
no more reason for placing an assessment on appeal within that category. It
is nothing but an assessment in either case, which is an administrative act.
The fact that the board of appeal may swear witnesses does not make the
proceeding a suit. Assessors are often empowered to do this without altering
the character of their functions.
This view is in accord with that of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia. ...
At the same time we do not lose sight of the fact, presented by every day's
experience, that the legality and constitutionality of taxes and assessments
may be subjected to judicial examination in various ways,-by an action
against the collecting officer, by a bill for injunction, by certiorari, and by
other modes of proceeding. Then, indeed, a suit arises which may come within
the cognizance of the federal courts, either by removal thereto, or by writ
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In reference to Boom Co. v. Patterson,"8 Pacific Railroad Removal
Cases,"s and Searl v. School Dist.,"' which involved the assessment of
the value of lands condemned for public use under the power of
eminent domain and which are subsequently examined, Justice Brad-
ley stated:
The general rule with regard to cases of this sort is, that the initial
proceeding of appraisement by commissioners is an administrative pro-
ceeding, and not a suit; but that if an appeal is taken to a court, and
a litigation is there instituted between parties, then it becomes a suit
within the meaning of this act of Congress ....
Relative to Delaware County Comm'rs v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co.,"
Gaines v. Fuentes,"5 Ellis v. Davis, 4 and Hess v. Reynolds," Justice
Bradley stated in the Upshur County case:
In Delaware County v. Diebold Safe Co. it was held that where a
claim against a county is heard before county commissioners, though
the proceedings are, in some respects, assimilated to proceedings before
a court, yet they are not in the nature of a trial inter partes, but are
merely the allowance or disallowance, by county officers, of a claim
against the county, upon their own knowledge, or upon any proof
that may be presented to them; but that an appeal from their decision,
tried and determined by the Circuit Court of the county, is a suit
removable to the Circuit Court of the United States ....
Gaines v. Fuentes and Ellis v. Davis, arose out of proceedings to set
aside the probate of wills; and although the granting of probate of a
will is not ordinarily a suit, yet, if a contestation arises, and is carried
on between parties litigating with each other, the proceeding then
becomes a suit .... Hess v. Reynolds . . . was the case of a creditor
instituting proceedings in a probate court against the estate of his
of error from this court, according to the nature and circumstances of the
case. Even an appeal from an assessment, if referred to a court and jury,
or merely to a court, to be proceeded in according to judicial methods, may
become a suit within the act of Congress. But the ordinary acts and doings
of assessors, or of appellate boards of assessors, in passing upon matters of mere
valuation, appraisment or proportionate distribution of expense, belong to a
different class of governmental functions, executive and administrative in
their character, and not appertaining to the judicial department. If an illegal
principle of valuation be adopted, or an unconstitutional assessment or tax
be made or imposed, or fraud be practised, it may be examined by one of the
judicial methods referred to, and thus become the subject of a suit.
s898 U.S. (8 Otto) 403 (1878).
69115 U.S. 2 (1885).
70 124 U.S. 197 (1888).
71 135 U.S. 467, 475 (1890).
72 133 U.S. 473 (1889) (removal by plaintiff claimant at a time when a plaintiff could
remove). See also Fuller v. County of Colfax, 34 Fed. 177 (C.C.D.Neb. 1882).
'392 U.S. (2 Otto) 10 (1875).
74 109 U.S. 485 (1883).
75 113 U.S. 73 (1885) (removal by the creditor of an estate, following his appeal from
the probate court to the state circuit court, was at a time when either plaintiff or de-
fendant could remove).
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deceased debtor, and then removing them into the Circuit Court of
the United States.76
Applying this principle to the facts in the Upshur County case, Jus-
tice Bradley held that the appeal, involving the tax assessment, to
the county court did not constitute a suit in a state court; and hence
the proceeding was not removable."
Commissioners of Road Imp. Dist. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry.71 illus-
trates, on the other hand, that an inter partes proceeding in a tribu-
nal, which irrespective of state judicial characterization is then per-
forming a judicial function, is a suit for removal purposes, although
at other times the tribunal may perform administrative or legislative
functions. Under the Arkansas Constitution the county court was a
judicial tribunal for many but not all purposes. In relation to road
improvement district proceedings in the county, the court had
such powers and duties as: the approval of a proposed improvement
district which then became a municipal corporation capable of suing
and being sued; the appointment of commissioners who are the gov-
erning body of the corporation; to pass upon the commissioners' plan
of improvement and estimate of cost; to appoint assessors who assess
the benefits and damages to the several parcels of land included; to
76 135 U.S. 467, 476-77 (1890). Justice Bradley summarized at 477 as follows:
The principle to be deduced from these cases is, that a proceeding, not in a
court of justice, but carried on by executive officers in the exercise of their
proper functions, as in the valuation of property for the just distribution of
taxes or assessments, is purely administrative in its character, and cannot, in
any just sense, be called a suit; and that an appeal in such a case, to a board
of assessors or commissioners having no judicial powers, and only authorized
to determine questions of quantity, proportion and value, is not a suit; but
that such an appeal may become a suit, if made to a court or tribunal having
power to determine questions of law and fact, either with or without a jury,
and there are parties litigant to contest the case on the one side and the other.
77 Upshur County v. Rich, supra note 76. Justice Bradley further stated:
Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, it does not seem
difficult to come to a decision. We have seen that, although the appeal from
the assessment was made to the "county court" eo nomine, yet that this is not
a judicial body, invested with judicial functions, except in matters of pro-
bate; but is the executive or administrative board of the county, charged with
the management of its financial and executive affairs. According to the princi-
ples laid down by the state court, the acts of this board, in matters of taxa-
tion, are as purely administrative as are those of the county assessors in mak-
ing the original assessment. Although we are not concluded by this decision,
it is so much in harmony with our own decisions on the same subject that
we accept it as correct.
Accord: Ex parte Oklahoma, 37 F.2d 862, 864-65 (10th Cir. 1930). Following a pro-
ceeding before the county treasurer to list and assess taxable property and his decision in
favor of the taxpayer, the state appealed to the county court and the taxpayer removed.
Held: The action was not removable: "Federal courts may give relief from unlawful or
fraudulent taxation where jurisdiction exists, but they have no power to act in an ad-
ministrative capacity, legislative or executive, in the listing, valuation and assessment of
property for taxation. Those are not judicial functions."
76 257 U.S. 547 (1922). Principle applied in: In re Judicial Ditch No. 24, 87 F. Supp.
198 (D. Minn. 1949).
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levy an assessment against all the real property in the district; and,
after the commissioners have filed the book of assessments in its clerk's
office, to hear and determine the justice of particular assessments
upon written objections filed by affected landowners, pursuant to
published notice, and enter a final judgment, subject to an appeal de
novo to the circuit court.
The Court observed that the distinction between a proceeding
which is the exercise of legislative power and of administrative char-
acter and a judicial suit is not always clear. In holding that a pro-
ceeding in the county court to assess benefits and damages growing
out of a road improvement was a suit brought in a state court for
removal purposes, Chief Justice Taft stated:
[The] proceedings for the making of this road improvement are in
the main legislative and administrative. There is, however, one step
in them that fulfills the definition of a judicial inquiry if made by a
court. That is the determination of the issue between the Road District
on the one part and the land owners on the other, as to the respective
benefits which the improvement confers on their lands, and the damages
they each suffer from rights of way taken and other injury ....
[T]he statutory designation of the action of a body as a judgment,
or the phrasing of its findings and conclusion in the usual formula of
a judicial order, is not conclusive of the character in which it is acting.
When we find, however, that the proceeding before it has all the
elements of a judicial controversy [Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10
(1875)], to wit, adversary parties and an issue in which the claim
of one of the parties against the other capable of pecuniary estimation,
is stated and answered in some form of pleading, and is to be determin-
ed, we must conclude that this constitutional court [the county court]
is functioning as such."'
The Chief Justice then asserted that the question of removal is a fed-
eral one, and rejected the state supreme court's holding in a similar
case that the county court's functions were administrative and not
judicial." After noting that the commissioners' book of assessments
and the landowner's written objections make the pleadings and that
there is a hearing thereon at which oral evidence may be adduced,
it was concluded that the proceeding is adversary and inter partes.
Continuing, the Chief Justice stated:
The manifest distinctions between the Upshur County Case and this
are, first, that the question here is not one of general taxation, . . . ;
second, that the County Court of Arkansas, differing from the West
Virginia County Court, is a court and by the constitution of the
79 257 U.S. at 553-55, 556, 557.
8 See p. 299 supra. See also Tool & Die Makers, Lodge 78 v. General Elec. Co., 170 F.
Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959), pp. 306-07 supra.
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State may exercise judicial functions in such subjects-matter; and,
third, that the proceeding is inter partes ...
The next objection is that the Road District Commissioners could not
file their assessment book in the federal court, assuming the necessary
diverse citizenship, against any lot or lot owner, and so that the
inquiry cannot be moved because, under . . . the Judicial Code,
removal is limited to cases within the original jurisdiction of the
District Court . . . . This limitation is not intended to exclude from
the right of removal defendants in cases in the state court which be-
cause of their peculiar form would be awkward as an original suit in
a federal court, or would require therein a reframing of the complaint
and different precedure . . . The limitation is that only those pro-
ceedings can be removed which have the same essentials as original
suits permissible in District Courts, that is that they can be readily
assimilated to suits at common law or equity, and that there must be
diverse citizenship of the parties and the requisite pecuniary amount
involved .. .i
Accordingly, where, following an administrative determination, an
appeal is taken to a court that is then functioning as a court in an
inter partes proceeding, there is a civil action brought in a state court
for removal purposes" even though an appeal de novo would lie from
this state court to another state court.8" Thus, where the other re-
quisites of removal jurisdiction are present, the suit may be removed
by the defendant. 4 The nature of the interests involved prior to and
on the appeal must be considered in determining who are the real
parties in interest"5 and whether the appellant should be treated as a
"1Commissioners of Road Imp. Dist. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257 U.S. 547, 560-62
(1922).
" Ibid.; In re Chicago, M., St.P. & P. R.R., 50 F.2d 430 (D. Minn. 1931) (Proceeding
before a state railway commission to determine whether tracks should be elevated or de-
pressed and how the expense should be borne is administrative. Appeal by the city, in the
name of the state, to the state district court to determine whether the commission's order
is lawful and reasonable is a suit and removable by the railroad.); Range Oil Supply Co.
v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 248 F.2d 477, 479 (8th Cir. 1957) (After appeal of Minne-
sota corporation to state district court from commission's order denying its request that
site on railroad right of way be set aside for its use, railroad could remove. "When ap-
pellant appealed to the state District Court it in effect began a civil suit in which it sought
to have the court hold that the order under review was unlawful and unreasonable. Ap-
pellant was the aggressor and it alone sought relief from the order of the Commission. At
this stage of the proceeding it became a civil action and as the jurisdictional requisites ex-
isted it was removable to the Federal court."); In re Judicial Ditch No. 24, 87 F. Supp.
198 (D. Minn. 1949) (proceeding for establishment of a judicial ditch were administrative;
proceedings became judicial when railroads appealed their assessment to the district court).
Cf. Collins v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mo. 1955), see pp. 303, 308
supra.
"SCommissioners of Road Imp. Dist. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257 U.S. 547 (1922).
84 Ibid.; Range Oil Supply Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 248 F.2d 477 (8th Cir.
1957); In re Judicial Ditch No. 24, 87 F. Supp. 198 (D. Minn. 1949); In re Chicago,
M., St.P. & P. R.R., 50 F.2d 430 (D. Minn. 1931).
85 In re Judicial Ditch No. 24, supra note 84 (landowners who initiated administrative
proceeding for establishment of a judicial ditch are real parties in interest, not the state;
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plaintiff or a defendant. And the mere fact that a party appeals from
the administrative and nonjudicial body does not constitute that
party a plaintiff or a defendant for removal purposes."
B. Condemnation Proceedings
The foregoing general principles also apply to proceedings for the
condemnation of property under the power of eminent domain. Such
a proceeding in a court, acting as a judicial tribunal, is a common-
law civil suit.8 When the requisties of federal jurisdiction are present,
the federal district court has both original and removal jurisdiction
of condemnation actions, with removal jurisdiction usually predicated
upon diversity and the requisite jurisdictional amount." Where the
condemnation proceeding is initially commenced in a court, acting
as a judicial tribunal, the proceeding is a civil action from the com-
mencement. "9 Thus, where a school district initiated a condemnation
proceeding in a Colorado state court, Searl v. School Dist. held that
a civil action was then begun in a state court for removal purposes.
"The fact," said Justice Matthews,
that the Colorado statute provides for the ascertainment of damages
by a commission of three free-holders, unless at the hearing a defendant
shall demand a jury, does not make the proceeding from its commence-
ment any the less a suit at law within the meaning of the Constitution
and acts of Congress and the previous decisions of this court ....
and following appeal by railroads to the state court from the assessment railroads could
remove); In re Chicago, M., St.P. & P. R.R., supra note 84 (appeal by city in name of
the state; city treated as real party in interest).
"
8Mason City & Ft. Dodge R.R. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570 (1907) (appeal by land-
owner from an administrative award in a condemnation proceeding; landowner, as con-
demnee, to be treated as defendant, although state law classifies him as a plaintiff); Chicago,
R.I. & P. R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954) (similar except appellant was condemnor;
and he should be treated as a plaintiff, not a defendant, for removal purposes); In re
Chicago, M., St.P. & P. R.R., 50 F.2d 430, 434 (D. Minn. 1931); In re Judicial Ditch
No. 24, 87 F. Supp. 198 (D. Minn. 1949).
s Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 367 (1875).
88See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959); Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
In the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 2 (1885), the railroad removed on the
basis of a general federal question in that it was incorporated under the laws of the United
States. This would no longer be a basis for removal.
89 Searl v. School Dist., 124 U.S. 197 (1888). City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 255 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1958):
Under the Federal statute [62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441
(1950)] only civil actions may be removed from a state to a Federal Court.
Although some state condemnation proceedings may not be, at every stage,
removable civil actions, the expropriation suit authorized by the Louisiana
act is a controversy between parties which is to be submitted to a judicial
tribunal for determination by an exercise of the judicial power. Such proceed-
ing is a civil action and so may be removed where, as here, diversity of citi-
zenship and jurisdictional amount are present.
This case was reversed insofar as the court of appeals had reversed the district court for
staying the removed action pending a determination in the state court of the city's power
of expropriation. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, supra note 88.
[Vol. 14
FEDERAL REMOVAL JURISDICTION
It is an adversary judicial proceeding from the beginning. The ap-
pointment of commissioners to ascertain the compensation is only one
of the modes by which it is to be determined. The proceeding is, there-
fore, a suit at law from the time of the filing of the petition and the
service of process upon the defendant."
There are many divergent state condemnation procedures, some-
times even within the same state."' Frequently a state will provide
some pre-judicial procedure or a procedure that is difficult to classify
as administrative or judicial, and then problems arise in determining
when a proceeding, initiated before some organ of the state, becomes
a civil action brought in a state court for removal purposes. In
Boom Co. v. Patterson, referred to in the Searl case, Justice Field
stated:
The proceeding in the present case before the commissioners appointed
to appraise the land was in the nature of an inquest to ascertain its
value, and not a suit at law in the ordinary sense of those terms. But
when it was transferred to the District Court by appeal from the
award of the commissioners, it took, under the statute of the State,
the form of a suit at law, and was thenceforth subject to its ordinary
rules and incidents . . .9
Applying the principles of the Boom Co. case, the Pacific Railroad
Removal Cases93 held that a proceeding instituted by the common
council of a city, before the mayor and a jury, to condemn land of
the railroad, to ascertain the value of the land taken, and to assess
the cost thereof on the property benefited, is not, while pending
there, a suit at law within the removal statute. However, it becomes
such a suit when transferred to the circuit court of the state on ap-
peal where it is heard de novo; and then, the other requisites of fed-
eral jurisdiction being present, the landowner could remove. Similar-
ly, Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co.94 held that
although a state county court may act administratively at a prelimi-
nary stage of the condemnation proceeding, when the proceeding in
o Searl v. School Dist., supra note 89, at 199-200.
5 Moore's Federal Practice 5 38.32 [2] and notes thereunder at 249 (2d ed. 1959).
" Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 403, 406 (1878). For Justice Bradley's
comment on this case and related cases, see p. 310.
93 115 U.S. 2 (1885).
" 196 U.S. 239 (1905). In this case a Kentucky corporation filed an ex parte applica-
tion with the county court for the appointment of commissioners to assess the damages
which the landowner, a Delaware corporation, was entitled to receive; commissioners were
appointed; following their report and award, the condemnor applied to the court for con-
firmation and process was then issued to the landowner, with a hearing to follow if ex-
ceptions were filed by either party; and from the judgment of the county court either
party could appeal to the circuit court, where the appeal was to be tried de novo. The
county court was acting administratively up to the application for confirmation of the
commissioners report, but at that time a suit was begun in a state court and the land-
owner was then entitled to remove on the basis of diversity and jurisdictional amount.
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the county court became inter partes, that a suit was then begun for
removal purposes; that this was not altered by the fact that an appeal
de novo could be taken from the county court to the state circuit
court; and that, although an exercise of eminent domain involves
the application of sovereign power, the state could not restrict its
exercise to its courts when the proceeding became a suit that is other-
wise within the cognizance of the federal courts."
In brief, an inter partes condemnation proceeding initiated in a
state tribunal exercising judicial functions is a civil action brought
in a state court for removal purposes." But preliminary proceedings
of an administrative, legislative, or executive character to ascertain
the value of the property to be condemned do not constitute a suit
(or civil action) within the removal statutes and thus are not re-
movable." Any subsequent proceeding, however, that has reached
the maturity of a civil action in a tribunal exercising judicial func-
tions is a "civil action brought in a state court" for purposes of re-
moval; and is then subject to removal-the fact that a de novo ap-
peal lies to another state court does not detract from the then ex-
isting right"-provided the other requisites of removal are satisfied."
The name given by the state to a particular tribunal is not controlling
as to whether it is a court for removal purposes.' 0 It is the function
then being performed by the tribunal that controls.' 1 Nor is the state
classification of the parties controlling, for the condemnor is a plain-
tiff for removal purposes and may not remove under the present
9" Ibid.
" Searl v. School Dist., 124 U.S. 197 (1888); City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 255 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1958).
'Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905); Pacific
Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 2 (1885); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. (8 Otto)
403 (1878); Village of Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 228 F.2d 647, 653
(8th Cir. 1956). In this latter case Judge Van Oosterhout stated:
[I]t appears that in Nebraska, as well as in Iowa, the proceedings before
the appraisers are not considered an action before a judicial tribunal. The
three-judge condemnation court is in reality just another board of appraisers.
We believe this conclusion to be somewhat further supported by the fact that
section 19-704, R.R.S. Nebraska 1943, gives the municipality ninety days after
determination of value to abandon the proceedings by ordinance, and the fact
that an appeal is allowed the owner only in the event that the project is not
abandoned. This, it seems to us, lends support to the view that the proceeding
before the three-judge court is merely a valuation proceeding, and that the
real controversy does not arise until after the lapse of the ninety days after
the valuation allowed the municipality for abandoning the proceeding.
The case was remanded to the condemnation court.
" Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., supra note 97.
"Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905); Pacific
Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 2 (1885); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. (8 Otto)
403 (1878).
'"Village of Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 228 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1956).
"' Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905).
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statute, 10 2 and the condemnee is a defendant for removal purposes."3
C. Workmen's Compensation Proceedings
Turning to proceedings under a state workmen's compensation
statute, we find that where the right to compensation is so dependent
upon the administrative procedure outlined in the statute as to render
the hearing before the state court, in effect, but another step in the
administrative procedure, the state court proceeding is not a civil
action for purposes of removal."' However, where, as in a limited
number of states, the statutory right is court-administered, the action
is civil and has been removable when the other requisites existed."'
The right of removal has, however, been largely eliminated by the
1958 amendment to § 1445.10
D. When A Civil Action Is "Brought"
Under the general removal statute, § 1441, a civil action, to be re-
movable, must have been "brought" in a state court, i.e., some pro-
ceeding tantamount to a civil action in a state court must be pending
before removal is in order; and until that time the petition for re-
moval is premature."'
Previous discussion has dealt with what constitutes a civil action;'
when a state tribunal is functioning as a court;' °9 with the distinction
between administrative and judicial proceedings;"' and when an ad-
ministrative proceeding followed by state judicial action may be said
to have ripened into a civil action pending in a state court."'
We turn now to orthodox proceedings of a civil nature to deter-
mine when they may be regarded as "brought" in the state court.
The matter under discussion is narrow. It is whether there is a civil
action pending for removal purposes or whether removal at this point
of time is premature; it does not concern the broader although re-
lated question as to when defendant's time for removal will expire-
12 Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
"03Mason City & Ft. Dodge R.R. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570 (1907).
14 Decker v. Spicer Mfg. Div. of Dana Corp., 101 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
"°SFresquez v. Fransworth & Chambers Co., 238 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1956); Valencia
v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670 (D. N.Mex. 1954).
"' 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c) (1950). This section prohibits re-
moval of compensation suits arising under the law of the state wherein the action was
brought; if the compensation suit (a transitory action) arises under another state's law,
the statute does not apply. See, e.g., Texas Pipeline Co. v. Ware, 15 F.2d 171 (8th Cir.
1926).
'"' Village of Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 228 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1956);
see p. 306 supra, note 48.
10 Pp. 299-305 supra.
'09 Pp. 305-07 supra.
11Pp. 307-14 supra.
111 P. 308 supra.
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a time that is not necessarily geared to when an action is "brought.'
A reference must be made to state law to determine what has been
done; but, as in situations previously discussed, state law is not de-
terminative as to whether a civil action has been "brought" for re-
moval purposes."'
A removal by a defendant does not admit that the action was
rightfully pending in the state court."4 Valid service of process upon
the defendant is not a prerequisite to removal, and the validity may
be challenged after removal."' Indeed, a defendant, otherwise en-
titled to do so, may remove before any service of summons is made
upon him, provided the plaintiff has "brought" a civil action by set-
ting in motion the state's judicial machinery against the defendant.1 '
English v. Supreme Conclave treats this matter well. Here the plain-
tiff had obtained from the state court a temporary restraining order
and an order to show cause, but original process had not been served
on the defendant. In upholding removal the federal court stated:
The plaintiff contends that a suit is not brought in the state Chancery
Court until subpoena [ad respondendum] issues ....
In the instant case the removal proceedings brought into the court,
not only the filed bill, but the rule and ad interim restraint referred
to. As the cause stood in the state court, and stands here, the de-
"'Basically the statute provides that a petition for removal is to be filed within 20
days from the time suit first becomes removable; ordinarily the time the defendant is
initially served, although in some instances an action will not become removable until
subsequent pleadings are filed by the plaintiff. This latter situation is expressly covered by
the second paragraph of § 1446(b). See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958); Mahony v. Witt Ice & Gas Co., 131 F.
Supp. 564 (W.D. Mo, 1955).
..a English v. Supreme Conclave, 235 Fed. 630 (D. N.J. 1916). See pp. 299, 306 infra.
114 Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 525 (1895), wherein the court stated:
Although the suit must be actually pending in the state court before it can
be removed, its removal into the Circuit Court of the United States does not
admit that it was rightfully pending in the state court ...
... Goldey v. Mornnig News, supra note 114; Clark v. Wells, 203 U.S. 164 (1906)
(prior state ruling not conclusive as law of the case).
.. English v. Supreme Conclave, 235 Fed. 630 (D. N.J. 1916); Parkinson v. Barr,
105 Fed. 81, 82 (C.C.D.Nev. 1900) (where complaint had been filed the "parties de-
fendant might appear without any service of process upon them, or either of them, and
file their petition for removal."); Williston v. Raymond, 213 Fed. 527 (E.D. N.Y. 1914);
Trower v. Stonebraker-Zea Live Stock Co., 17 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Okla. 1937) (service
on other defendants); Yellowstone-Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Rosenbaum Bros., 277 Fed.
69 (D. Mont. 1922) (defendant may remove before service if service is theoretically
possible). Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 82 F. Supp. 975, 985 (D. N.J. 1949):
[T]he rule seems to have been in interpreting the old Judicial Code that de-
fendants not served in the state court action could petition for removal of
the cause to the federal court. . . .The revised Judicial Code apparently
has not changed this rule. . ..
Also, a nonresident defendant, otherwise entitled to remove, who has been served with
process may remove, although the other nonresident defendants have not been served with
process and have not appeared. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1939).
See also Hutchins v. Priddy, 103 F. Supp. 601, 607 (W.D. Mo. 1952); S.E. Overton Co.
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 115 F. Supp. 764, 772 (W.D. Mich. 1953).
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fendants were and are required to make answer to the rule directed
against them, and they continue under the restraint imposed upon
them in such proceedings. Surely in every sense, except a technical one,
such proceeding was and is a suit pending ....
While the filing of a bill in the state Court of Chancery may not be
the commencement of a suit, so as to bring it within the meaning of
"pending" in a state statute, authorizing the transfer of a cause from
one state court to another, the filing of an injunction bill in a state
court, followed by an ad interim stay, pending the hearing of a rule
to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue in said
cause, is a suit within the meaning of the Federal Statute in question.117
If an action is commenced in a state court in accordance with its
usual and normal procedure,11 s then, of course, the action may be
properly regarded as "brought" for removal purposes. However, as
we see from the rationale of the Supreme Conclave case, something
less than such a regular commencement will suffice. And so a state
action is "brought," for removal purposes where an attachment or
garnishment is levied;119 an order for the civil arrest of defendant is
obtained; 1 ' or in some other manner the defendant's person or prop-
erty is subjected to judicial restraint.. or the state's judicial ma-
chinery is set in motion against the defendant."
IV. MUST BE INDEPENDENT AND NOT SUPPLEMENTARY
Although such requisites for removal exist as the necessary diver-
sity and jurisdictional amount, these alone will not suffice. In addi-
tion, to warrant removal the "civil action" must be an independent
... English v. Supreme Conclave, 235 Fed. 630, 631-32 (D. N.J. 1916).
118 For discussion, see 2 Moore's Federal Practice 5 3.03, at 703 (2d ed. 1959); see
also 2 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1268 (1949).
119Dulion v. S.A. Lynch Enterprise Fin. Corp., 53 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 285 U.S. 540 (1932).
2'Williston v. Raymond, 213 Fed. 527 (E.D. N.Y. 1914).
12'English v. Supreme Conclave, 235 Fed. 630 (D. N.J. 1916).
.. Philipbar v. Derby, 85 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1936) (before the complaint filed).
The court stated:
The denial of the remand was therefore right unless the removal was pre-
mature because the process alone had been served, . . .we can find no decision
suggesting that a cause may not be removed before the plaintiff has pleaded,
and there is no reason in principle to support such a notion. Dulion v. S. A.
Lynch Enterprise Finance Corp. [53 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 540 (1932)]. . . . When the removal depends upon the nature of
the cause of action, for obvious reasons it is impossible to know what it will
be until the plaintiff has pleaded, and he alone can say what the pleading will
be. . . . But that has nothing to do with the removability of a cause for
diversity of citizenship.
affirming 11 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. N.Y. 1935); Hornung v. Master Tank & Welding Co.,
151 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D. N.D. 1957), wherein the court stated: "The fact that there
was no state court file on the case until completion [of the removal proceedings] has no
significance because, so long as the state court had acquired jurisdiction by service of
process, removal could be initiated prior to filing of the pleadings there."
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suit and not a proceeding supplementary or incidental to another
action.' This proposition is well settled and not subject to dispute.
Difficulty, however, arises at times in applying the doctrine, and
some conflict ensues in its application. This is particularly true in re-
lation to garnishment proceedings brought to enforce a judgment."4
Before proceeding to a discussion of the above proposition that the
action must be an independent suit, we refer to certain related mat-
ters discussed elsewhere. Although the federal district courts, held
within the states, have no probate jurisdiction, they do exercise both
original and removal jurisdiction over inter partes suits, within com-
mon-law and equity jurisdiction and federal cognizance, that arise
out of or pertain to probate proceedings but are independent in char-
acter and not merely incidental or ancillary to the probate."2 ' And,
if otherwise within federal cognizance, a federal court may adjudi-
cate claims in and to a res, over which a state or other federal court
has jurisdiction; but it may not exercise either original or removal
jurisdiction over proceedings that interfere with the in rem court's
prior and subsisting jurisdiction."'
Despite a verbal kinship, the proposition under discussion that the
suit must be of an independent character should be distinguished
from the doctrine of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (c). This latter subsection
(c) authorizes a defendant to remove an entire case whenever a
separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined by plaintiff with one or more
otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action.2 ' The independent
"'Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 281 (1880); Barrow v. Hunton, 99
U.S. (9 Otto) 80 (1878); Bank v. Turnbull & Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 190 (1872).
;24 Randolf v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1958); Clarkin
v. Worthley, 114 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Toney v. Maryland Cas. Co., 29 F.
Supp. 785 (W.D. Va. 1939).
125 See pp. 303-04 supra; p. 321 infra.
21 Mullendore v. American Sur. Co., 27 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 653 (1929); New York v. National Cancer Hosp. of America, 153 F. Supp. 484
(S.D. N.Y. 1956); Daughtery v. Sharp, 171 Fed. 466 (C.C.E.D.Mich. 1908).
117 American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951) (held not separate and in-
dependent); Snow v. Powell, 189 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1951) (held not separate and in-
dependent); Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th
Cir. 1958) (held separate and independent). Section 1441 (c) has no application to re-
movability of an after-judgment garnishment proceeding. As noted by J. Van Oosterhout in
Randolf v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1958):
We are unable to see where § 1441 (c) applies to the facts of our present
case. The only issue is the liability of the garnishee. . . . Moreover, in the
present controversy, we have only one defendant, the garnishee. There has
been no joinder of the present civil action with any other cause of action,
and certainly no joinder with a cause of action which is not removable.
We believe that the present case . . . was properly removed to the federal
court by virtue of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (a). The garnishment proceeding
is a civil action.
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suit doctrine, now discussed, deals, however, with a controversy that
arises subsequent to a state court action that was either nonremovable
or, if removable, was not removed. The mere fact that the contro-
versy had its origin in or emerges from the original state action does
not make it a part thereof.' If otherwise within federal cognizance,
the controversy is removable when it is essentially a separate suit;
1
"'
but not if it is substantially a part of,"' an incident to,"' or continu-
ation of the prior action."' Thus, the Court in Barrow v. Hunton
stated:
The question presented with regard to the jurisdiction of the circuit
court is, whether the proceeding to procure nullity of the former
[state court] judgment ... is or is not in its nature a separate suit,
or whether it is a supplementary proceeding so connected with the
original [state] suit as to form an incident to it, and substantially a
continuation of it. If the proceeding is merely tantamount to the
common-law practice of moving to set aside a judgment for irregular-
ity, or to a writ of error, or to a bill of review or an appeal, it would
belong to the latter category, and the United States court could not
properly entertain jurisdiction of the case. Otherwise, the Circuit
Courts of the United States would become invested with power to
control the proceedings in the State courts, or would have appellate
jurisdiction over them in all cases where the parties are citizens of
different States. Such a result would be totally inadmissible.
On the other hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to a bill in
equity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining thereof, then
they constitute an original and independent proceeding . . . . In the
one class there would be a mere revision of errors and irregularities, or
of the legality and correctness of the judgments and decrees of the
state courts; and in the other class, the investigation of a new case
arising upon new facts, although having relation to the validity of an
actual judgment or decree, or of the party's right to claim any benefit
by reason thereof."'
And the Court held that the statutory proceeding" ' brought, pur-
suant to Louisiana law, in the same state court which had rendered
the default judgment to have that court declare the judgment "a
118Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 281 (1880); Pettus v. Georgia R.R. &
Banking Co., 19 Fed. Cas. 396 (No. 11048) (C.C.M.D.C.Ala. 1874), modified on other
grounds, 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
19Bondurant v. Watson, supra note 128; Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Arkansas Valley
Sugar Beet & Irrigated Land Co., 54 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1931); Ward v. Congress Const.
Co., 99 Fed. 598 (7th Cir. 1900).
'"West v. Aurora City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 139 (1867); Thompson v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 14 F.2d 230 (D. Minn. 1926) (unsettled remnant).
"'. Ladd v. West, 55 Fed. 353 (C.C.D.N.H. 1893); see note 150 infra.
"'Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 80 (1878); Bank v. Turnbull & Co., 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 190 (1872).
"'3 Supra note 132, at 82-83.
1" For comparable federal practice, see rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. (1958).
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nullity" for want of proper service was a direct attack and nonre-
movable. On the other hand, the cases hold that an action to enjoin
or otherwise obtain relief from a judgment on the basis of fraud,
accident, or mistake, which is essentially the same as the independent
action in equity,'35 should be treated as a separate suit and removable
if otherwise within federal cognizance. 3
The two foregoing distinct lines of cases illustrate the practical poli-
cy that underlies the separate suit doctrine. If the controversy is so
related to the state action that it is not properly severable from the
action that was either nonremovable or in any event not removed,
then the controversy is not properly removable. This is true, for if
removal of the controversy alone were allowed this would do prac-
tical violence to the state action; and the removal statutes do not
warrant removal of both the controversy and the state action, which
has quite often gone to judgment, on the sole basis of the contro-
versy. On the other hand, where the controversy is severable, as a
practical matter, from the state action and is substantially equivalent
to a common-law action or suit in equity, removal is warranted since
it does no practical violence to the state action and safeguards the
statutory right of removal.
Although in deciding whether the controversy is or is not a separate
suit for removal purposes the federal court must necessarily look to
the state proceeding and state law to see what is being done, the ul-
timate determination involves the construction and application of
the removal statutes.'37 Consequently, this is a federal matter for in-
dependent federal decision, 3 ' with due thought given to the
proposition that a state cannot validly restrict the right of removal."9
In Barrow v. Hunton'4' the Court said:
The character of the cases themselves is always open to examination
for the purpose of determining whether, ratione materiae, the Courts
... For discussion see 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 55 60.36-.40, at 601 (2d ed.
1959).
'36Carver v. Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Co., 73 Fed. 9 (C.C.E.D.Tenn. 1896);
Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 62 Fed. 1 (C.C.D.S.C. 1894); Stack-
house v. Zunts, 15 Fed. 481 (C.C.E.D.La. 1883).
". Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 80 (1878); Ward v. Congress Const. Co.,
99 Fed. 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1900) ("While the proceeding now in question evidently was
intended to be auxiliary to the decree of the state court, and was so in form, yet in
fact, ratione materiae, it was not of that character."); Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 185
F.2d 96, 99 (8th Cir. 1950).
" 3Note 137 supra.
'.. Donald v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 241 U.S. 329 (1916); Harrison
v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 232 U.S. 319 (1914).
'"'Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 80, 85 (1879); and see Ward v. Congress
Const. Co., 99 Fed. 598 (7th Cir. 1900).
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of the United States are incompetent to take jurisdiction thereof. State
rules on the subject cannot deprive them of it.
Although two other Supreme Court cases have failed to furnish
an adequate guide for lower courts as to whether or not a post-judg-
ment garnishment proceeding is a separate suit for removal pur-
poses, 41 they do, nevertheless, illume our problem. These cases are
Bank v. Turnbull & Co. 4' and Bondurant v. Watson. 4' In Turnbull,
after A had recovered judgment in the state court against B and a
writ of execution had been levied on certain property, T, a third
person, pursuant to state statute, intervened and asserted a claim of
ownership, gave suspending and forthcoming bonds, and the state
court made an order for trial of the issue of title. Following removal
to the federal court by T, " the Supreme Court characterized the
statutory proceeding to try title as "merely auxiliary to the original
action, a graft upon it, and not an independent and separate litiga-
tion." Holding against removal, the Court further stated:
The contest could not have arisen but for the judgment and execution,
and the satisfaction of the former would at once have extinguished the
controversy between the parties. The proceeding was necessarily in-
stituted in the court where the judgment was rendered, and whence
the execution issued. No other court, according to the statute, could
have taken jurisdiction. It was provided to enable the court to determine
whether its process had, as was claimed, been misapplied, and what
right and justice required should be done touching the property in the
hands of its officer. It was intended to enable the court, the plaintiff
in the original action, and the claimant, to reach the final and proper
result by a process at once speedy, informal, and inexpensive. That it
was only auxiliary and incidental to the original suit is, we think, too
clear to require discussion .... '"
The Turnbull doctrine has been applied to a prejudgment interven-
tion proceeding to determine the intervenor's title to attached prop-
erty, '4 and also to a postjudgment proceeding to determine title, even
141 However, see the excellent discussion in Randolf v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 260 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1958).
14.83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 190 (1873).
'4' 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 281 (1880).
... The state court in its order to try title provided that T should be regarded as the
plaintiff in the statutory proceeding. So far as removal was concerned this was, however,
immaterial, for as the Court pointed out the Act of March 2, 1867, permitted either
plaintiff or defendant to remove.
'' Bank v. Turnbull & Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 190, 195 (1873).
14 King v. Shepherd, 20 Fed. 337 (C.C.N.D.Iowa 1884). After plaintiff had taken de-
fault against defendant, but prior to enty of default judgment, plaintiff removed the entire
case against the defendant, the garnishees, and the intervenors. Held: Case should be re-
manded since plaintiff had lost his right to remove as to defendant by taking default against
him, and the intervening proceeding to try intervenors' title to attached property was
auxiliary to main suit.
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though arising several years after the judgment was rendered. "
Bondurant v. Watson,4 ' involved a situation comparable to that of
Turnbull, except that the third person did not intervene in the state
action to assert his title, but instituted an equity suit in a state court
to enjoin the judgment creditor in the prior suit from enforcing his
decree against the now-plaintiff's property; the equity suit was
removed by the defendant judgment creditor. In holding that this
equity action was an independent suit for removal purposes, the
Court reasoned that the controversy in the original cause had been
ended by a final judgment. Further, the present equity case had its
origin in the former judgment, but it was a new and independent
suit between other parties and upon new issues. It was a suit in which
the plaintiff sought, in effect, to be protected against a judgment, to
which he was not a party, by which his property had been specifically
condemned to be sold to satisfy a claim against others, and not against
him.
The Court distinguished Turnbull on the basis that Turnbull in-
volved merely a statutory proceeding to try in a summary way the
title to personal property seized on execution. The state court in di-
recting its own process, according to the Court in Bondurant, had
merely made a graft upon the original action.
That an action is in form an independent suit is not determinative.
It has been held that the Bondurant doctrine does not warrant re-
moval where the now-plaintiff was in privity with the defendant in
the original action, and the matter now made the basis of the inde-
pendent suit could have been pleaded in the prior original action;...
14. Flash v. Dillon, 22 Fed. 1 (C.C.E.D.Tex. 1884). In September, 1877, A recovered
a money judgment against B in a Texas state court. In January, 1882, an execution issued
and was levied upon a stock of goods. Under Texas statutory law T filed her oath and
claim bond and took the property levied upon as her own. A then removed the proceeding
by T, but the federal court remanded on the theory that the proceeding was not such
an independent suit as could be removed unless the original suit had remained undetermined
and was also removed with it.
148 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 281, 287 (1880).
... Richmond & D. R.R. v. Findley, 32 Fed. 641, 643 (C.C.N.D.Ga. 1887). A brought
an ejectment suit in the state court against B, who was holding possession under the X
Company, a Georgia corporation. During the pendency of this suit the X Company trans-
ferred the property, by perpetual lease, to the R Company, a Virginia corporation. The
R Company then sued in the state court to enjoin further prosecution of the ejectment
suit, and subsequently removed this suit into the federal court. In remanding, the court
characterized the X Company as the real defendant in the ejectment suit, and distinguished
the Bondurant case in this manner:
The complainant in that case .. .had distinct rights which he claimed inde-
pendently of those claimed by any party to the original litigation. The original
case had gone to judgment. He sought to be protected against the judgment
on account of rights he had that were in no way involved in the controversy
between the parties to the original suit.
Here the complainant acquires the control of the property, to recover
which a suit is pending, and then instead of defending that suit, sets up by
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or, where proceedings at law and equity are distinct, the subsequent
suit in equity is to complete or perfect the right adjudged at law.'
Where following judgment for plaintiff in an ejectment suit the de-
fendant, under the state statutes, filed his petition in the suit as an
"occupying claimant" to have the value of his improvements ascer-
tained, this proceeding was "essentially part of and ancillary to the
main suit" and nonremovable. 1 And, even though a plaintiff has
dismissed his suit, defendant's cross-action or counterclaim against
the plaintiff, which remains for adjudication, is not removable.'
On the other hand, the following have been held to be independent
suits for removal purposes, within the Bondurant rule: a proceeding
to enforce a decree against a person who was not a party to the origi-
nal suit nor in privity with a party;..' a creditor's bill to reach and
apply property fraudulently transferred;... and, despite a contrary
holding,"5 ' a motion proceeding by a judgment creditor of a corpora-
tion, with execution returned nulla bona, and on notice to a stock-
holder to have an execution against the stockholder for the amount
of his unpaid stock."'
bill in equity the same matters he could have pleaded in the original case,
and claims the right to remove the case to this court when it could not have
been removed by the party from whom he acquired his rights. I do not think
he can do so.
... Ladd v. West, 55 Fed. 353, 354 (C.C.D.N.H. 1893). Plaintiff sued a managing
partner for damages resulting from a nuisance created by the partnership, and recovered
judgment. Later plaintiff brought another such action against the same defendant for the
same kind of nuisance occurring at a subsequent period; and still later brought a pro-
ceeding in equity against both partners, setting up the former judgment and the pendency
of the later action at law, and praying for consolidation, perpetual injunction, and the
assessment and recovery of damages accruing subsequent to the proceedings at law. In hold-
ing that the equity proceeding was not removable by the defendants, the court said:
The right having been established at law in a case not removable, a subsequent
proceeding in equity to regulate or perfect the right by injunction is ancillary
to, or in aid thereof; or in other words, in a sense, at least, a part of the
original proceeding. . . .Bringing in a new party defendant, who was a partner
in the business sought to be regulated, does not make this proceeding any less
a part and parcel and continuance of the original litigation.
151 Chapman v. Barger, 5 Fed. Cas. 477 (No. 2603) (C.C.D.Iowa 1877).
". West v. Aurora City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 139 (1868); see p. 304 supra.
.Sa In Ward v. Congress Const. Co., 99 Fed. 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1900), the court
stated: "In its essence, the proceeding was a new suit or new application for an injunction
against a new party, rather than an ancillary proceeding for contempt of the original
injunction against a party bound thereby."
... Kalamazoo Wagon Co. v. Snavely, 34 Fed. 823 (C.C.D. Kan. 1888); contra in tenor,
Coeur D'Alene Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Spalding, 93 Fed. 280 (9th Cir. 1899), cert. denied,
174 U.S. 801 (1899).
... Webber v. Humphreys, 29 Fed. Cas. 525 (No. 17326) (C.C.E.D.Mo. 1879); Lacka-
wanna Coal & Iron Co. v. Bates, 56 Fed. 737 (C.C.W.D.Mo. 1893), discusses but re-
fuses to follow the Webber case.
... Lackawanna Coal & Iron Co. v. Bates, supra note 155. The court said:
It would not be questioned if, in the absence of this statutory proceeding,
the judgment creditor had found Mr. Bates in this state, and had proceeded
against him by bill in equity to reach assets in his hands belonging to the
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Other cases are cited in the notes as illustrative
of a proceeding that is sufficiently auxiliary or supplementary to
another proceeding or action as to be nonremovable;157 and
of a proceeding which, if otherwise within federal cognizance, is
sufficiently independent as to be removable. '
debtor corporation, it would have been a "suit" removable into this jurisdic-
tion. And since the state supreme court declares that the motion for execution
is in the nature of a suit in equity to reach such assets, and is an independent
and original action, to be treated independently of the cause against the cor-
poration, as between the petitioner and the defendant stockholder, with the
right of trial, appeal, and writ of error as in any other action at law, it must
be a suit, within the meaning of the act of congress; and if so, why is not this
defendant, who by chance is found within the state, and called into court by
process to litigate the question as to whether or not he is a stockholder, and
the extent of his liability, entitled to his constitutional right as a non-resident
to have his cause tried in a federal court?
5 Thompson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 14 F.2d 230, 231 (D. Minn. 1926). Enforcement
of statutory lien for attorney's fees. Intervention proceeding by plaintiff's attorneys to
enforce their statutory lien for fees, which was a lien upon plaintiff's chose in action or
any settlement thereof without the attorney's consent. The court stated:
It is true that the only real controversy which now exists in this case is that
between the attorneys for the plaintiff and the defendant; but the attorneys
are resorting to the original cause of action and enforcing a right with respect
to it allowed them by statute. It is not a new controversy, but in effect the
unsettled remnant of an old one, and the right of removal must be based upon
that controversy.
New York v. National Cancer Hosp. of America, 153 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. N.Y. 1956)
(application in a state receivership for an order directing cy pres distribution; and see
note 126 supra); Coeur D'Alene Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Spalding, 93 Fed. 280 (9th Cir.
1899) (proceeding for appointment of receiver in aid of execution; and see note 154
supra), cert. denied, 174 U.S. 801 (1899).
.. Porter v. F. M. Davies & Co., 233 Fed. 465 (8th Cir. 1915) (plenary action by
receiver to recover a money judgment against a third person). Holbrook Irr. Dist. v.
Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet & Irrigated Land Co., 54 F.2d 840, 842 (10th Cir. 1931)
was a suit to determine water priority between a plaintiff with a favorable statutory
adjudication rendered in one water district and a defendant with a favorable statu-
tory adjudication rendered in another water district. Neither party was a party to the
statutory adjudication in favor of the other. The court stated:
In determining whether, when priorities are decreed in different districts,
a federal court has jurisdiction to determine a conflict between them, it is only
necessary to consider whether this is a civil suit at law or in equity between
citizens of different states, and a sufficient amount is in controversy. In such
a case, a federal court has original jurisdiction and a suit may be removed
to that court from a state court. ...
It is contended that there is no removable controversy because this suit is
merely supplemental to a main action. But it is not of that character, and
there is no statute in Colorado which authorizes supplemental proceedings
for the determination of conflicting priorities arising in different water dis-
tricts. The plaintiff itself invoked the equity jurisdiction of the state court
by virtue of a statute, which requires an independent suit for that purpose.
If the state court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the conflict in this suit,
then the federal court, on removal, had jurisdiction over the controversy.
Pettus v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 19 Fed. Cas. 396, 400 (No. 11048) (C.C.M.D.
Ala. 1879) involved a claim for attorney's fees as a lien on the adverse party's property.
A bill had been filed in a state chancery court, by certain complainants, in behalf of
themselves and other creditors, to assert and enforce a lien on certain railroad property
which had been sold and was in the possession of the purchasers. After final decree by
which the lien was established, and while a reference to the master was pending to
ascertain the amounts due the creditors who sought the benefit of the decree, the pur-
chasers of the railroad property against which the lien had been declared, paid the corn-
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V. CONCLUSION
The removal limitation embodied in § 1441 by the phrase "civil ac-
tion brought in a State court" is perhaps troublesome in but a few of
the several thousand suits that are annually removed from state fo-
rums to the federal district courts.159 Like so many phrases that
abound in law, civil action is easy to define in general terms, but
sometimes difficult to apply in a particular proceeding. Although the
problem of what constitutes a civil action can be prevalent in origi-
nal suits, the problem is more inherent to removal. This is because a
state proceeding may commence as administrative matter and then at
a subsequent stage change to a civil action,' and because a state fo-
rum may characterize the nature of a proceeding differently than the
federal court."'1 Much of this confusion, of course, can be obviated
by bearing in mind that the question whether the removed suit
equalled a "civil action brought in a State court" is to be determined
under federal law.' On the whole, however, as reflected by the cases,
the federal judges and the practicing bar have shown an admirable
appreciation of the problem presented.
plainants their claims in full, and bought up and settled other claims entitled to the
benefit of the decree. Counsel for complainants having received no compensation for their
services, in respect to these last-mentioned claims, filed their petition in the original suit
against the purchasers of the railroad property and claimed a lien on the property for fees
in respect to those claims, that the amount of their fees be determined, and, if said sums
were not paid, that the property be sold to pay the same. This petition was not a mere
graft upon or appendage to the original suit. The court said:
If the purpose of the petition in this case were to obtain an order of the court
that the petitioners' fees for services might be paid out of the property of their
clients, which their services had secured and brought into court, or which
the court had in its possession, there might be some ground for the idea that
this was a graft on the main suit. But that is not the object of the petition.
The petitioners are asserting a claim for their fees, not against their own cli-
ents, but, in effect, against the property of the opposite party.
Modified on other grounds, 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
9 During 1959, 4,054 cases were removed from the state courts. Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 184 (1959).
"0 Range Oil Supply Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 248 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1957).
'" Crivello v. Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Middlesex, 183 F. Supp. 826
(D. N.J. 1960).
sea See cases cited in note 16 supra.
